The National Security Adviser Is Statutorily the Principal Coordinator of National Security.

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has directed the constitution of an 11-member committee to draft a National Threat Assessment and a five-year Strategic Defence Operations Plan, a move that has drawn significant interest from security analysts and political observers. While superficially a step toward strategic coherence, a critical examination of the committee's composition, the timing of the announcement, and the broader political context reveals a more complex manoeuvre raising questions about civilian control, military professionalism, and the political management of insecurity ahead of the 2027 elections. The most glaring anomaly is the appointment of the Special Adviser on Homeland Security, Major General Adeyinka A. Famadewa (rtd), to coordinate the committee and provide secretariat support.

The committee includes National Security Adviser Mallam Nuhu Ribadu; Minister of Defence Lt. General Christopher Musa (rtd); Minister of State for Defence Alhaji Bello Muhammad Matawalle; Chief of Defence Staff Lt. General Olufemi Oluyede; Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu; Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Sunday Kelvin Aneke; and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Idi Abbas. The Directors-General of the Department of State Services, Tosin Ajayi, and the National Intelligence Agency, Ambassador Muhammed Muhammed, complete the membership. Major General Famadewa brings a demonstrable record of competence, with significant experience in counterinsurgency operations and strategic planning.

However, professional competence alone does not justify placing a relatively junior officer, by tenure and institutional hierarchy, in a coordinating role over the National Security Adviser and the entire service chief establishment, many of whom were his superiors. Famadewa served as Principal General Staff Officer to the National Security Adviser between 2015 and 2021, operating under the very office he is now asked to supervise. This is not a promotion but a calculated rebuke suggesting a vote of no confidence in existing coordination mechanisms.

The National Security Adviser is statutorily the principal coordinator of national security. By appointing another Adviser to coordinate the committee, the President has effectively designated the NSA and the entire security apparatus as principals to be assessed, not coordinators of the process. This dynamic is reminiscent of the US experience prior to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lacked real authority and service chiefs exercised undue influence, leading to a fragmented command structure.

The Nigerian directive does not clarify the command relationship between the Homeland Security Adviser and the NSA; it superimposes an additional layer of coordination on an already contested terrain, likely exacerbating the fragmentation it purports to solve. The directive reveals an uncomfortable truth the administration has been reluctant to acknowledge publicly. President Tinubu noted that operational requirements were currently often considered individually, without sufficient reference to an agreed national threat assessment or unified medium-term plan, making coordination more difficult and limiting efficient deployment of resources.

This is a public admission of a systemic breakdown in the nation's security architecture. By publicly constituting this committee, the President is creating a historical record that he is actively fixing a broken system, a classic political move to deflect criticism and buy time. In Israel, successive governments failed to formulate an approved National Security doctrine for 25 years, contributing to military unpreparedness.

Similarly, India operates without a formalised national security vision, leaving the armed forces responsible for the entire national security process in a bottom-up approach that undermines strategic coherence. This is not a structural reform but a personalised intervention that risks deepening the politicisation of command, where promotions and appointments are shaped by political expediency rather than merit and operational effectiveness. The committee serves as a reason for the failure of existing structures.