The Feature Gained Attention After Samuel Tunick, an Atlanta Man, Allegedly u Ed It During a Cu Tom and Border Protection Top at Hart

The feature gained attention after Samuel Tunick, an Atlanta man, allegedly used it during a Customs and Border Protection stop at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in January 2025, leading to federal charges. Duress passcodes come in three types: destructive (wipes data), deceptive (shows decoy data), and signaling (silently alerts a third party). GrapheneOS's destructive option, available since June 2024, erases all user profiles, data, and the eSIM partition without reboot, and the process can't be stopped once triggered.

It works by wiping encryption keys, leaving only unrecoverable ciphertext. Stock Android and iOS lack this feature, and no app can add it. Users need a Pixel phone and must install GrapheneOS themselves.

Prosecutors charged Tunick under 18 U.S.C. § 2232, which carries up to five years in prison. His lawyers are seeking to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, with a ruling expected later this year. Similar laws exist in the UK and EU, though none have been tested with a duress passcode.

The GrapheneOS Foundation argues the feature is constitutionally protected in the US. A German Federal Court of Justice ruling from March 2025 found that compelling a suspect to use a fingerprint to unlock a phone doesn't violate self-incrimination protections, unlike entering a password. GrapheneOS doesn't offer a duress biometric feature to counter such rulings. "creating and using GrapheneOS is strongly protected by the US Constitution"